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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MARY IRETA CROFTS, 
Plaintiff arnd Appella;nt, 
-vs.-
.JOSIAH HOYT CROFTS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No.11165 
BRIEF 0'F RESP·ONDENT. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Tlrn Plaintiff-Appellant sought an accounting and a 
Declaratory Judgment concerning her rights under the 
property settlement provisions of the Decree entered in 
a diYorce case in Garfield County. 
:F'rom Findings of Fa0t settling the account of De-
f rndm1 t-Respondent under his obligations to the Plain-
tiff oud from a Declaratory Judgment interpreting other 
provisions of the Decree, the Plaintiff took this appeal. 
To follow Appellant's form, we refer to the parties 
as Appellant and Respondent. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The Trial Court, hearing oral evidence from both 
parties and receiving a verified accounting from the Re-
spondent, resolved the balance remaining under a de-
f erred obligation based upon stipulation of the parties 
and entered its Declaratory Judgment on those other 
provisions of the Decree which the Plaintiff sought to 
have interpreted. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks to ha\'e the Trial Court af-
firmed; however contending that he should have been 
granted credit for an additional $500.00 under his ac-
counting and the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is important at the outset to observe that the 
Respondent was not nor has he ever been delinquent in 
any payments of alimony or support money (R. 42-44, 
279) ; in fact, he had overpaid alimony and received 
credit for those 2xcesses agains,t a $10,000.00 obligation 
(hereinafter defined) when the Appellant re-married 
and the children either returned to live with their father 
or attained majority (R. 267) thus fixing permanently 
Respondent's total and overall Jia bility for alimony and 
support payments (R. 202-205). 
Appellant, in the apparent belief Respondent had 
become responsibl2 to mah payments under the $10,000.00 
obligation, restricted as to source ancl rate of payment 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
uy terms of the Decree to sale of business assets (R. 4), 
til<>d this rather singular action which may be premature 
hut to which Respcndent did not object on that ground. 
The underlying stipulation (R. 3 and 4) contained 
lfrspowlent 's agreement to pay alimony and support 
money (not disputed in this proceeding) and a provision 
that tlie plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $7,500.00 
to he paid by the Respondent to the Appellant out of 
''profits arising from business interests held by 
the Defendant [Respondent] and shall be, imme-
diately due and payable out of the sale of busi-
ness assets of the Defendant to third parties. Said 
amount shall be payable at the rate of 50% 
of the gross sales proceeds until said $7,500.00 
has been paid in full" (R. 4). 
This stipulation was later amended first by inter-
lineation (R. 4) and later by re-statement (R. 29-31), 
each party giving and taking something, to increase the 
$7,500.00 to $10,000.00 and significantly to add a limiting 
proYiso to the rate of its payment which, when the stipu-
lation was amended, restated, and re-executed, said: 
'' 4. As a permanent, complete and final settle-
ment of the rights of the Plaintiff in the property 
of the Defendant, the Plaintiff shall be awarded 
the total sum of $10,000.00, which shall be paid by 
the Defendant to the Plaintiff out of profits aris-
ing from business interests held by the Defendant 
and which profits are actually distributed and re-
ceived by the Defendant, and shall be immediately 
due and payable out of the sale of business assets 
of the Defendant to third parties and actual re-
ceipt by the Defendant of said sale proceeds. Said 
amount shall be payable at the rnte of 50 per cent 
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4 
of the gross sales proceeds until said $10,000.00 
has heen paid in full. In addition the Dcfeudant 
has the option to prepay any part of the amou11! 
pro rided." (Italicized material represents that 
added by the amendments at H. 4 and 30.) 
The stipulation further provided that the Appellant 
could have the exclusive possession, use and occupancy 
of the home in Panguitch which she never exercised (R. 
165, lines 2-12 and R. 211) and in the event the home 
property was sold, then ''the equities realized from the 
sale of said property shall be equally divided between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant" (R-31). 
At the time cf hearing the Court, heiug appropriately 
solicitous that the Appellant understood the terms of the 
stipulation and the proposed Decree, read the provision 
just quoted and the following colloquy ensued: (R. 13) 
THE CoenT: And in the eYcnt there are no profits 
and he retains the ownership of the property, 
then, of course, there ·would be no income with 
which to distribute this ten thousand dollar debt; 
isn't that correct? 
J\lR. OLSEN: That would be correct. 
THE CouRT: Do you understand that Mrs. Crofts~ 
J\lRs. CROFTS: Yes, in case he newr sold his prop-
erty, then he would lH'Yer pay me, is that "·hat 
you mean? 
THE CouRT: Y cs, in case t lie re is no profit or in 
case he (loesn 't se>ll out, ·will you get this ten thou· 
sand dollars~ 
~Ins. CnoFTS: T don't lrnow. 
THE CounT: That \\'HS my concern. 
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l\111. OLSEN: Under this provision, if there were no 
profits in the business and there was no sale of 
the asset~, !here wouldn't be any way of maturing 
and reqmrmg payment of the ten thousand dol-
lars, is that the way you understand it, Mrs. 
Crofts~ 
?-.Ins. CROFTS : \V ell, yes, only he said that if his 
wages were raised again, you know -
(R. 16) 
MR. OLSEN: For the record, Mrs. Crofts, do you 
think you understand the provisions concerning 
the ten thousand dollar lump sum settlement~ 
~[Its. CROFTS: I think so. 
THE CouRT : And so far as you are concerned, is 
the property settlement which is outlined in that 
agreement satisfactory to you under these cir-
cumstances~ 
J\f Rs. CROFTS : Yes. 
Appellant's Point IV says the Trial Court erred in 
not ordering Respondent to furnish to her inf orm.ation 
by which she can determine when, if any, sales of busi-
lll'ss assets took place. This is precisely what the Court 
belo-w ordered (R. 315, Appendix Page i). 
\Ve are ready to furnish Appellant any records or 
c1ata which are relevant and appropriate under that 
order and no issue with respect thereto is before this 
( 'ourt. 
Respondent has heretofore furnished abstracts of 
tax returns for ali years material to these proceedings 
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(R. 90) alld stipulated at the time of trial that sin~, 
Appellant petitioned for an accounting RPspondeut hau 
made some sales of business assets (R. 157). 
Most importantly, and pursuant to that represen. 
tation Respondent on December 5, 1967, tendered to 
Appellant the full amount adjudged by the Court trr 
remain clue under the $10,000.00 award hut Appellanl 
rejected the tender (Appendix Page i). Respondent still 
remains willing and able to pay the amount the Trial 
Court fixed. 
Immediately before and for some time after the di-
vorce, the Appellant was in Arizona racing a string of 
horses (R. 163, 211) and later married a track veteri-
narian (R. 310). Consequently, Appellant never lived in 
the home of the parties as the Decree contemplated but 
neither has the home been sold; nevertheless, Appellant 
wanted the Court to determine what her interest in the 
''equities'' of the home would be in the event it were sold. 
Appellant wanted a $500.00 advance which Respond· 
ent granted, stating that he wanted this applied on the 
property settlement to which Appellant agreed (R. 211, 
212) ; however, the Court disallowed this in Respondent's 
accounting as lwing too remote in time (R. 315). While 
tlisagreeing with the Court's ruling, ReRpondent never· 
theless tendered the $500.00 with the other funds (Appen· 
clix Page i). 
To a\'oid rerwtition the remaining facts Respondeut 
cleems material will be staiecl in th(' argnm<'llt. 
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POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY HELD: 
[A] THA'l' THE $10,000.00 SUM AWARD-
ED APPELLANT BY THE DECREE WAS 
PAYABLE AT SUCH TIME AS THERE 
\VERE ACTUALLY DISTRIBUTED TO AND 
IUJCEIVED BY THE RESPONDENT PRO-
CEEDS FROM THE SALE OF BUSINESS 
ASSETS; [B] THAT NO INTEREST AC-
CRUED UNTIL AN EVENT OCCURRED 
l\IAKING RESPONDENT LIABLE TO PAY 
AN AMOUNT OR AN INSTALLMENT. 
Neither by their original stipulation nor by the in-
terlineated amendments could the parties have made it 
plainer that the fund for payment of this $10,000.00 obli-
gation was specific and the obligation to pay therefrom 
restricted. 
Both stipulations (R. 4, 30) as well as the Decree 
(R. 30) confirmed Respondent's obligation to pay from 
a restricted source: profits from business transactions 
and sales of business assets. ''Salaries'' are excluded by 
necessary implication which Appellant does not dispute. 
Profits and proceeds from sales are clearly distin-
guishable; however, the rate of payment was regulated 
by the proviso: 
''Said amount shall be payable at the rate of 
50/o of the gross sales proceeds." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Hespondent was a member of a saw-milling concern 
(H. 12) which could have had profits but no distributions 
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and conversely distributions without profits. A partner. 
ship often can show an economic gain but have no liqui<l 
funds with which to pay a "dividend" or withdrawal. 
Correspondingly, the Respondent could conceivably 
receive actual distribution of proceeds from sales ot 
business assets where there would be no "profit" but 
only 8. return of capital or sometimes a capital loss. 
Withdrawals from the partnership may be classified as 
distribution of "profits" even though called "salaries.'' 
The parties' agreement provided, therefore, that if 
the Respondent had profits he would be obligated to pay 
conditioned on actual receipt of gross sales proceeds (re-
gardless of gain or loss on the sales). 
On the receipt of gross sales proceeds, he became 
obligated to pay 50% thereof (whether a profit or not) 
up to the extent of ''profits'' from all sources, whether 
from sales or from operations in the usual course of 
business. 
There is nothing ambiguous about the provision of 
the Decree and stipulation. 
Both the source and rate of payment of the 
$10,000.00 are confined to a fund specified thusly: 
"Said amount shall he payable at the rate of 
50% of the gross sales proceeds until said $10,-
000.00 has been paid in full" (R. 39). 
Parties mav contract to confine the payment of au 
obligation to a. special fund and snch method of pay-
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ment is exclusive. West v. Anderson, 171 Okla. 165, 42 
P2d. 6f>3. 
In fact, the obligor is not even liable where the obli-
gation is payable from a restricted fund which never 
eomes into existence. Stern v. Franks et al., 96 P2d 802 
' ' 
33 Cal. App.2d 676. Gardner v. Trigg, 59 Ariz. 397, 129 
P2d 6ti6. 
Such claim is not made here except to demonstrate 
that Respondent has had no. liability to pay anything on 
the $10,000.00 because he had received no proceeds from 
sales of business assets as appears from Respondent's 
1-erified accounting (R. 90, 91) which is not disputed. 
Notwithstanding he had no unqualified liability to pay, 
Respondent had in fact prepaid in excess of $5,000.00 
on the account because Appellant requested funds of 
him (R. 222 et seq.). 
Respondent received proceeds from sales in the 
year 1967 and tendered Appellant the full remaining 
balance. (Appendix p. i.) 
[BJ INTEREST ON THE $10,000.00 
Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah 355, 122 P2d 201, holds that 
judgments providing for periodic installments under a 
decrel' do not bear interest until they are unqualifiedly 
payable. 
Reference by counsel to interest on a judgment for 
one-half of the yalne of community property is inappli-
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cable because that payment was due when the decree was 
entered. Payment was neither deferred nor conditional. 
Here the payment is both def erred and conditional. 
It may never have become due. 
The a·ward interpreted in Scott v. Scott (1967), 19 
U2d 267, 430 P2d 380 1cas a specific sum in deferred in-
stallments ($1,000_00 per month for 121 months)_ 
The Court said at Page 383 of 430 P2d: 
The right to such accrued installment payments 
"\'ested in the plaintiff on the due date of each in-
stallment, and the plaintiff is entitled to interest 
thereon at the legal rate until payment is made. 
Arnold v_ Arnold, 140 NvV2d 874, is in accord with 
our position: ''specific periods payments'' bear interest 
from the time they become due and owing, not before. 
The Decree says : 
Said amount shall be payable at the rate of 50% 
of the gross sales proceeds until said $10,000.00 
has been paid in full. 
It does not say "until :,;aid $10,000 together with i11' 
terest has been pnid in full.'' 
Appellant's 01dy claim to interest lies in her asser-
tion that the $10,000.00 obligation attains the dignity of 
a judgment. 
This thesis is wholly dissipated when considered in 
light of an annotutiou in 33 ALR2cl 145G where the au-
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thor, in a compendium of the cases, summarizes the rule 
and rationale thereof as follows: 
The theory behind this rule [that divorce-decreed 
installments bear interest from the date they be-
come due] appears to be that such installments 
are in the nature of separate judgments which 
bear interest as they become due. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Utah's decision of Boyle v. Baggs, 10 U2d 203, 350 
P2cl G22, is entirely consonant with this view of '' sepa-
rate judgments'' to the extent they impose the incident 
of a lien when due a11id unpaid. 
Vol. 47 CJS, P. 35, Interest, Section 21c, expresses 
the rnlc that: 
The right to interest on judgments being purely 
statutory, interest may be allowed on only such 
judgments as come within the provisions of the 
statute. 
Roberts v. Roberts, 69 Wash. 2d, 420 P2d 864 holds 
that each installment of alimony, when unpaid, becomes 
a separate judgment and bears interest from the due 
date. 
The Utah cases of McKay v. McKay, 13U2d187, 370 
P2d 358 and Larson v. Larson, 9 U2d 160, 340 P2d 421, 
hold thnt interest accrues only after delinquency in an 
i11stnllmc11t. These cases affect alimony; hmYever, the 
pri1wiple of separate judgments applies to lump sum or 
property settlement awards: H eustis v. H eustis (Ky.) 
:381 S\V2d 333, holds that an unliquidated claim bears no 
interest until liquidated by reduction to judgment. 
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Martin v. Martin (Okla.) 350 P.2d 270 holds that 
where a judgment awarded the wife a lump sum of 
money payable in a specified period the wife was not 
entitled to interest from rendition of judgment where 
payment was made within the time fixed. Similar hold-
illgs are found in Viser v. Viser, 243 La. 706, 146 So2d 
409; Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 117 NE2d 65. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED 
THAT "EQUITIES" IN THE HOME PROP-
ERTY MEANT THE SALE PRICE LESS 
ENCUMBRANCES. 
It is entirely concei vahle that the home property 
would never be sold. This possibility is contemplated 
by stipulation and the Decree ( R. 4, 5, 31, 40). It is 
here that Appellant entirely misconceived the issue. The 
two provisions in the Decree, although they may on su-
perficial inspection appear inconsistent on their face, 
apply to two different fact situations, i.e., a situation 
~where the Appellant may (although she has not to the 
present time) desire to occupy the home, in which event 
the Defendant is responsible for the monthly mortgage 
payments; 1 and secondly, a situation where the parties 
mutually agree upon a sale in which event the equities 
will be divided. 
Those equities arc to he cletcrmim•cl by deducting 
the encumbrances and dividing ilw remainder. Crowder 
v. State Dept. of Social Securdy, 239 P2d 387. 
1 Which he has done and continues to do. 
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Pierson v. Ball, 189 So. 679, 138 Fla. 104, holds that: 
In common parlance the word equity has refer-
ence to the value of the property in excess of en-
cumbrances against it which amount to a lien. 
Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Allen, 261 
NW 912, 220 Iowa 448 holds: 
The term "equity" means the remaining interest 
belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged 
his property, or the surplus or value which may 
remain after the property has been disposed of for 
the satisfaction of liens. And" equity" is defined 
as the amount of value of the property above the 
total liens or charges. 
Whatever disposition is made of the home will de-
termine the parties' ''equities.'' If it is not sold the 
problem \Yill be moot but Respondent must continue to 
make the mortgage payments according to the terms of 
the mortgage at the monthly rate specified. 
If the home if; sold, the amount of liens will then 
have to be determined and the remaining ''equity,'' ar-
rived at by deducting these encumbrances from the sale 
pric<>, is to be divided. 
POINT III 
THE '11 RIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
SETTLii\G 'THE ACCOUNTING BETWEEN 
'rHE PARTIES. 
'l'hc matter of interest, raised by Appellant in both 
her Puints I and IJI, has heen treated in this brief under 
Point I. 
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Appellant complains that Respondent should not 
have been given credit for payments he made to her out 
of the final payment upon a home the parties had occu. 
pied while tempornrily residing in Salt Lake City or for 
sale of a pasture in Panguitch. 
The record does not disclose in any place where the 
property was held in "joint tenancy." Under an argu. 
mentative cross-examination conducted by counsel against 
the Defendant, the Attorney for the Plaintiff ''advised'' 
Mr. Crofts that the property likely was in joint tenaney 
as that was customarily the ·way it was handled if an 
attorney prepared the documents and Mr. Crofts oblig-
ingly agreed that that must have been how it was if coun-
sel told him so (H. 258, 259). The difficulty is that there 
is no proof anywhere that there was title to the property 
at all. 
The facts are that Mr. Crofts was a Utah State Com-
missioner of Agriculture and rather than renting a home 
in Salt Lake during his temporary absence from South-
ern Utah where his business was located he contracted 
to purchase a home in Salt Lake City which was their 
residence during his tour of service for the State. His 
wife's name may have been on the contract but nothing 
except negative evidence it "must have been" was be-
fore the Court. 
The pasture in Panguitch probably was m joint 
tenancy being for Appellant's race horses. 
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Evidence of 1u1 interest of Appellant in these prop-
erties is a responsibility which the Plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving if any is asserted. 
The Respondent did not produce any evidence of 
title but relied on an agreement between the parties 
found by the Court as a matter of fact to have been con-
summated, that if Appellant received one-half of the net 
proceeds from those sales they would be credited on the 
$10,000.00 obligation (R. 253, 257, Exhibit 6, R. 310). 
Two checks were exchanged; one for the Salt Lake 
real estate contract and one for the Panguitch pasture 
(R. 254). 
The Court found as a fact that the agreement was as 
}fr. Crofts testified. The entitlement of the parties being 
in doubt respecting (1) title to the property, contract, 
proceeds, or other interests therein and (2) the question 
of whether or when the $10,000.00 obligation would be 
payable, the parties could effectively contract to apply 
the amounts Appellant received on the property settle-
ment agreement. 
The fact that Appellant's name was on a contract 
documellt does not automatically give her a vested inter-
rst in the proceeds of the sale (Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 U2d 
:388, :rn7 P2d 179.) 
'l'he Comt found (R. 318) that the parties reached 
an ::i.eeord and satisfaction on the question whether the 
Decree intended the $10,000.00 to include all interests in 
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any property of a community or marriage-acquired char. 
acter and that they resolnd any dispute by paying Mrs. 
Crofts one-half the proceeds and mutually agreeing to 
credit those amounts to the obligation. 
POINT IV. 
RESPONDENT ·wILL FURNISH TO AP-
PELLANT RECORDS APPROPRIATE TO 
VERIFY WHAT IS ALREADY SHOWN IN 
THE RECORD. 
Since the Trial Court has already ordered what Ap. 
pellant seeks by this point we see no necessity to argue it. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Trial Court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Def end ant 
and Respondent. 
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APPENDIX 
MATTSSON & JACKSON 
Carvel Mattsson Norman H. Jackson 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone 896-5441 Area Code 801 
December 14, 1967 
:'\fr. Ken Chamberlain 
Olsen & Chamberlain 
Attorneys at Law 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 
Doar Ken: Re: Crofts v. Crofts 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. J. H. Crofts 
at 2.)0 South 3rd West, Panguitch, Utah. 
Mrs. Ireta R. Anderson sent to us recently the check 
which is enclosed herewith and which bears No. 387, is 
Lloted December 5, 1967, is made payable to the Order 
of Ii-eta R. Anderson, and her attorneys Carvel Mattsson 
1!11c1 E(hnHd Richards, is in the sum of $4,563.84 and is 
Llrawu by .J. H. Crofts on the Bank of Iron County, Paro-
1rn11. Utah. 
On the back of the check you or Mr. Crofts typed 
th0 following: "Full satisfaction of J dgmt of Sixth Dis-
trict Court.'' 
The said sum will not be accepted in satisfadion of 
the Jnclg-me11t, for which reason the check is being re-
turned to you herewith. If Mr. Crofts desires to pay 
tlie said sl;m of $4-,563.84 to apply on whatever amount 
i~ finally determi11cd to he due and to stop the running of 
interest. on that amount, the payment will be accepted and 
ere di tell hut not 0t herwise. 
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APPE~DlX - (Continued) 
In the near future you will receive a Notice of Appeal 
in this matter. There are a number of items we want the 
Utah Supreme Court to rule on. 
In the last Decision of J uclgr Erickson, there was an 
Order that you furnish us ·with information and data 
relative to sales of business assets and receipt of business 
profits. We have not received such data, the nature of 
which is spelled out in the Demand and Request for pro. 
duction of documents served on you under date of May 
27, 1967. It will be appreciated if you will furnish these 
items to us without delay. 
CM:lo 
Enclosure 
Yours very truly, 
MATTSSON & JACKSON 
By /s/ CARVEL MATTSSON 
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